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The Economic Feasibility of Expanding Iowa's Fresh Vegetable
Production for the Commercial Wholesale Market
Introduction
The current financial crisis in midwestern agriculture has prompted
farmers and policymakers to search for profitable alternative crops that can
diversify Iowa's agriculture so that farmers and the state economy will be
less reliant on corn, soybeans, cattle and swine. Among the alternative crops
suggested for diversifying Iowa agriculture are fresh vegetables for the
commercial wholesale market.
Although Iowa currently grows and sells a limited number of fresh
vegetables commercially, most sales occur at roadside stands, farmers markets,
or pick-your-owns, with some vegetables sold directly to local retailers
(Hall, 1985). Any significant esq^ansion of Iowa's production, however, would
increase competition with commercial suppliers from other states in large
volume wholesale and retail markets in Iowa and midwestern population centers.
Analyzing the economic feasibility of competing effectively with the major
producing states now supplying midwestern markets can indicate where the
opportunities are greatest and where the potential disadvantages may be
insurmountable.
A number of basic issues need to be addressed prior to making
recommendations concerning the introduction of large scale fresh vegetable
production to the Midwest. Other regions of the country have become very
specialized in the production of certain vegetables both year round and in
seasonal markets. Other states currently supply more than 90 percent of
Iowa's summertime commercial wholesale market (Valley, 1985). In order to
evaluate Iowa's economic potential in expanding fresh vegetable production.
the costs of vegetable production and transportation costs from these states
to the midwest markets must be examined. If Iowa producers can grow and market i
L-
the product for less than producers in the other states, then the potential ^
for expansion in Iowa exists. w
Farmers who might switch from more traditional crops to the production of i--,
I
vegetables will often have little or no experience in fresh vegetable
production. This lack of e:^erience is an added risk that must be considered. ^
'tm
Fresh vegetables are usually assumed to be both more profitable and exhibit
more price and yield risk than do grain crops. During the planning process, ^
most managers would like some measurement of the profit-risk tradeoff —
associated with alternative crops. Tjrpical production-budget cost estimates
indicate what up-front or preharvest variable costs are associated with \
u»
producing fresh vegetables compared with producing corn and soybeans. If the
crop is unmarketable for some reason (storm damage, disease, etc,), cost ^
estimates can also show how much of the production costs are incurred before ^
harvest. Larger preharvest costs imply a large loss from non-marketable
crops,
w.
The variability of profits for fresh vegetables and traditional crops can
also be compared to give growers another estimate of the profit-risk tradeoff. ^
Assuming the majority of operators prefer lower risk enterprises, crops that _
have a modest return and small year to year changes in profits will be ^
preferred to crops with the same modest return and larger year to year changes |
in profits.
The market potential for fresh produce should be examined to determine ^
price responsiveness at different production levels and the profit levels ^
associated with that production. For example, certain fresh fruits and ^
vegetables have been characterized in the past as boom and bust industries i
(Spotton et al., 1986), Their cyclical price and production behaviors often
J result in severely low prices that may force some operators out of business.
^ Buyers' perceptions of quality also influence the market potential for
certain vegetables. Buyers in the commercial wholesale market may have
locational preferences because they perceive that produce from a particular
M
area is,of better quality or that the producers in certain regions are more
J reliable suppliers. If buyers perceive that midwestern produce is lower in
quality, they may want to pay a lower price or may not accept the produce.
J Although vegetables may be available from a new producing area, they may not
be considered a good substitute for produce from current suppliers. Thus,
buyers' perceptions of quality can be a significant risk factor for commercial
market entrants.
Currently some states seem to dominate the fresh vegetable industry. If
one looks only at the overall production figures, California would seem to
have a production advantage in a number of the fresh produce crops.
California produces as much as 90 percent of annual U.S. production in crops
such as cantaloupe and broccoli. Does California enjoy strictly a seasonal
climatic advantage, or does it have lower costs in horticultural production
even in the summer months? Have rising transportation costs erased any
production-cost advantage which California might have in competing with Iowa
producers. Could north-central states supply more of the summertime
consumption, or can California producers consistently undercut midwestern
producers due to lower costs and, thus, keep the Midwest out of commercial
fresh production during the summertime? These are the issues and questions
this study will address.
n
Objectives
This study examines Iowa's potential to e:q)and its commercial wholesale
fresh vegetable industry in the Midwest for 13 major vegetables: broccoli,
snap beans, cabbage, sweet corn, cucumbers, leaf lettuce, muskmelon, green
peppers, potatoes, summer and winter squashes, tomatoes, and watermelons. In
particular this research will investigate:
a) Iowa's potential for self-sufficiency in each crop,
b) Iowa's ability to supply nearby metropolitan markets, (i.e., Chicago,
Kansas City, Minneapolis, and St. Louis), and
c) The potential impacts of a larger vegetable industry upon Iowa income
and the opportunities for small farmers to enter Iowa agriculture.
To address these issues, the following procedures will be used:
1) Iowa's current production levels and market channels will be explored
to determine a basis for the potential expansion. By using estimates
of Iowa's current volumes within each market channel, the potential
for additional production to serve the local market can be approxi
mated.
2) Iowa's current competitors in Iowa and major metropolitan markets
in surrounding states will be determined.
3) Production cost estimates for Iowa and competing states will be
developed in order to study relative production costs.
4) Local and nearby metropolitan area demand potential will be
estimated.
5) Iowa's production and transportation costs to local and selected
nearby markets will be compared to competing states' production and
transportation costs to the same markets. In addition, the risk
associated with production will be compared across regions to analyze
n
the effects of that risk on the.amounts supplied from each region and
on prices.
5) The nearby metropolitan market requirements and volume potential
identified in the commercial wholesale buyer survey by Spotton et al,
(1986) will be considered in determining the feasibility of
successfully competing in those markets.
The Iowa Vegetable Market Situation
Iowa's 1984 vegetable production, and the market channels available,
examined together, can help identify the potential for expansion. If the
quantities of fresh vegetables demanded within a particular market segment can
be estimated, and if the quantities of vegetables that are being grown for
that particular channel can be established, then an expansion potential for
that particular market can be estimated.
The structure of the market, with its three major channels—processing,
direct-to-consumer (fresh), and commercial wholesale fresh—and the market
requirements of those channels are important to growers wanting to enter the
industry. Growers need to be able to identify their market outlet, and market
requirement information is necessary for the product to conform to the rigid
standards set in certain outlets and therefore be marketable.
Iowa production
Vegetable harvested-acreage estimates for Iowa are available for 1982 and
1985. The 1982 Census of Agriculture (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1984)
lists the harvested acreage by crop and lists the number of fruit and
vegetable growers in Iowa during that year, but does not indicate how the
product is marketed. Those acreages are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. 1982 Iowa Fruits and Vegetables
By Crop^
Number of Farms and Acreages
Crop
No. of
Farms Acres
No. of
Crop Farms Acres
kJ
Broccoli 11 7 Green Peppers 40 75
Snap beans 51 34 Potatoes 149 1767 1
Cabbage A6 105 Squash 64 97
Sweet Corn 298 5619 Tomatoes 128 473
Cantaloupes 82 429 Watermelon 64 345 (
Cucumbers 40 29 !
Total Acres 8980
I
^Source: U.S. Dept of Commerce, 1982 Census of Agriculture , 1984.
tea
A second estimate of fruit and vegetable acreage was provided by Henry
Taber, Iowa State University Extension Horticulturist, based upon his observa
tions in 1985 (Hall, 1985). Taber's estimates approximate planted acreage,
but actual harvested acreage is probably smaller. These estimates when used
to calculate total production, therefore, probably overestimate harvested
acreage because no adjustment is made for non-harvested acres. In addition,
the yield estimates associated with these acreages are based on irrigated
crops, whereas, according to the 1982 census, a high proportion of the acreage
is not irrigated. These estimates are, nevertheless, more useful because he
separates sweet corn, potatoes, and tomatoes for the processing market from
the two fresh-market channels. These three crops have more estimated
processing acreage than fresh acreage according to Hall (1985). Taber's
fresh-market vegetable acreage estimates are shown in Table 2.
These two estimates of Iowa vegetable acreage are not strictly comparable
because of the different sources, years, and techniques used to obtain the
Table 2. 1985 Iowa Fruits and Vegetables; Acres, Yield and Production'
H
Planted^ Irrigated^ Assumed
Crop Acres Yield/Acre Production
p (cwts.) (cwts.)
m
Broccoli 0 N.A. N.A.
Snap beans 0 N.A. N.A.,
• Cabbage 200 250 50,000
Sweet Corn 3700 95 351,500
Cucumbers 0 N.A. N.A.
Leaf Lettuce 0 N.A. N.A.
Muskmelons 800 150 120,000
Green Peppers 80 145 11,600
Potatoes 600 250 150,000
Squash, Pumpkins 250 300 750,000
Tomatoes 60 300 18,000
Watermelons 700 400 280,000
Total Acres 6390
Source: Hall, 1985.
^Asstimes planted acres are completely harvested.
'Assumes crops are irrigated to obtain these yields.
data. However some general conclusions regarding the possibility of increased
production for certain fresh-market vegetable channels can, be reached.
In 1982, the average number of acres grown per farm of each vegetable was
between .5 and 5 acres, with the exceptions of sweet corn and potatoes. The
average sweet corn acreage was approximately 20 acres and average potato
acreage was slightly less than 12 acres..
Th® 1982 Census of Agriculture gives the number of farms by size class.
For all vegetables reported, excluding potatoes, there were 429 farms. Of
these, 253 were less than 5 acres in size, and an additional 90 were less than
25 acres, leaving 86 farms that were 25 acres or more. Thus, vegetable
acreages per farm generally could be characterized as small, with a few larger
farms.
Only 115 of the 429 farms growing vegetables were classified as vegetable
farms according to the 1982 Census of Agriculture. Only 46 of the 115
vegetable farms had receipts greater than $10,000. Overall, 243 of the 429
farms that grew vegetables had receipts greater than $10,000, but the data do
not detail what portion of the receipts came from vegetable sales.
Potato production followed a similar pattern. Most farms grew less than
five acres of potatoes. Of 149 farms, 123 were less than 5 acres in size, an
additional 13 were less than 25 acres, 10 were less than 100 acres, and only 3
were greater than 100 acres. Unfortunately, potatoes were included in a
category with sugar beets, peanuts, hay, and other field crops, so there was
no way to determine the number of potato operations that sold in the direct-
to-consumer market.
For most of the crops studied, further analysis provides some insight
into which market channel producers use. By studying the 1982 Census of
Agriculture county data, the number of farms and acreages by crop per county
can be determined. With the exceptions of sweet corn, potatoes, and tomatoes,
the county information shows that the acreages per crop and farm are small and
that only a limited number of the farms have enough acreage in any one crop to
be potentially involved in the commercial wholesale channel. The remaining
acreages that could be in the direct wholesale channel were' still only a small
amount of the total production necessary to meet in-state consumption needs.
Also, only cantaloupe, tomatoes, and watermelon had significant irrigated
acreages. Of the 8363 acres of vegetables grown in 1982 only 871 acres were
irrigated. Irrigation is typically required to maintain a consistent
week-to-week supply and, thus, permit participation in the commercial
wholesale market.
Specific production levels can not be clearly assigned to each market
channel by using the statistics available. The data can, however, be used as
a starting point for determining the Iowa expansion potential for fresh
vegetables.
The Market Channels
Three major market channels are available to producers of fresh
vegetables. These channels are the processing, direct-to-consumer, and the
commercial wholesale fresh channels (Figure 1). Theicommercial wholesale
fresh market is the primary focus of this study, but because growers have a
choice .of market channels and the requirements to enter each channel are
different, all three channels will discussed.
The processing market channel
Processors either freeze-or can fresh produce to extend its shelf life.
The processing sector in the U.S. is characterized by many small firms and a
few large firms with several processing plants. Typically processors buy
within a 50-mile radius of their plants and contract a high percentage of the
acreage before planting time. For example, in Wisconsin the contracted
acreage can run as much as 80 to 90 percent of the total acreage harvested for
processing (Rhodes, 1983).
Although production for year-round consumption via processing could lead,
to greater acreages for Iowa, the distance to processing plants in Iowa limits
the feasibility of processing crop production, at least in the short run.
Furthermore, the crop varieties needed for processing can be considerably
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Figure 1, Fruit and Vegetable Marketing Channels
different than those used in the commercial wholesale markets. For example,
chipping potatoes are bred to have low soluble sugars so that the chips won't
caramelize (brown) during the chipping process. Not all fresh tablestock
varieties have that characteristic. Also, the harvesting techniques for
processing typically are different from those in the commercial wholesale
fresh channel. For example, tomatoes for processing are picked mainly with
mechanical harvesters and fresh commercial production is still largely
hand-picked, although there has been some movement toward mechanical harvest
ing of fresh produce (Kader et al., 1985).
The direct-to-consumer market channel
The direct-to--consumer channel is another primary market outlet. There
are several marketing methods in this channel, including the pick-your-owns
(u-^picks), roadside stands, and the farmers' markets. In direct-to-consumer
markets the producer and the consumer bypass all the middlemen in the
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commercial wholesale .fresh produce channel. Both the consumer and producer
benefit because the price is usually between the wholesale price the farmer
would normally receive and the retail price the consumer would normally pay.
With u-pick operations, the producer depends on the consumer to pick the
produce, saving the grower considerable harvesting and postharvesting costs.
The consumerin'return, often gets a lower price and a product closer to
maturity that, at least in the consumer's view, is a better quality product.
The farmers' markets and roadside stands similarly provide a place for growers
to sell directly to the consumer and are fairly similar to one another in
their requirements except for their location. Roadside stands are usually
close to the producers' operations on busily traveled roads, whereas farmers'
markets are located in town centers or in high traffic portions of the city
where consumers are likely to pass by while shopping. Both of these marketing
methods require a producer to harvest and temporarily store the produce, but
do eliminate most of the postharvest-handling middlemen. These markets also •
allow the producer to receive a price that can approach or exceed the retail•
price. A considerable amount of Iowa's produce appears to be sold in either
u-picks or roadside markets. Iowa's farmers' markets are in various stages of
development in the major cities and are gradually becoming more prevalent in
the smaller towns.
One of the difficulties with studying the feasibility of e2q)anding
production in the direct-to-consumer market is the lack of available data. Of
the three major market channels discussed, the direct-to-consumer channel has
less price and quantity information available than any other channel. The
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) collects data on planting
intentions for a limited number of fresh and processing vegetables. Marketing
data such as fresh wholesale market arrivals (quantities) and wholesale prices
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are only collected in a few cities in the United States. These wholesale
price and quantity data do not necessarily include or reflect direct-to-
consianer marketing prices or quantities. Shipments and shipping prices are
collected only in the most prominent shipping states. These data primarily
cover produce moving in the processing and commercial wholesale sectors. Hie
acreage data associated with the commercial wholesale fresh channel are
sketchy in states that have small production acreages, but, in general, the
data are sufficient for the purposes of this study.
The commercial wholesale fresh market channel
The commercial wholesale fresh produce marketing channel is diagrammed in
Figure 2. There are five basic levels to the market channel. Produce does
not move in any particular set way from the grower to the consumer. The
driving force at the top of the channel is the consumer. Just beneath the
consumers are the retail outlets and institutional outlets. The retail
outlets primarily consist of supermarket chains (including national, regional
and local chains) and local grocery stores. The local grocery stores can be
loosely allied for bargaining advantages or they can be totally independent.
Institutional buyers include hospital cafeterias and food service outlets such
as restaurants and fast-food chains. Fast-food chains are important fresh
produce outlets inasmuch as they have instituted salad bars in recent years to
please health-conscious consumers.
At the next level in the channel are the terminal markets and the
wholesaler-retailers. Terminal markets usually are associated with large
cities where fresh produce has come to the end of the marketing chain in a
region. From the terminal market, the produce is dispersed to either the
grocery stores or the institutional outlets within the region. Terminal
Jobbers
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Figure 2, The Commercial Wholesale Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Channel
Information from Vitelli et al. (1982)
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markets are characterized by a large number of merchants who are organized
together into a centralized assembly and selling area. Although the terminal
market used to be the major distribution center for fresh produce, it has
declined in importance in the last 30 years, though this decline has
stabilized recently. Besides the terminal market merchants in an area, there
may be a number of independent wholesalers who take possession and title and
resell produce to their customers, especially in areas where the terminal
market no longer exists. Inasmuch as Iowa has no terminal markets,
independent wholesalers and wholesale-retailers are the main wholesale outlets
within the state.
The wholesaler-retailers are large retail chain stores that have
centralized wholesaling and distributing for the entire chain. They also may
be the wholesaler for other chain stores. The wholesaler portion of the chain
accepts orders from the individual units of the chains and organizes the
buying for the quantities ordered. But the organization of wholesaler-
retailer units differ. Some chains force their individual units to buy from
their main wholesaling unit; others allow their units to buy from other
sources. Thus, producers may find that it is possible to sell either to the
individual local stores or the centralized purchasing unit.
At the next lower level, and declining in importance to the industry in
the share of produce they handle, are other middlemen such as selling agents,
brokers, commission merchants, and merchant shippers. These middlemen usually
perform functions that facilitate ease of movement of different fresh produce
items. For example, small producers may want a selling agent, working on a
contractual basis to sell their output. The selling agent may have some
degree of freedom in pricing the produce but never takes title or possession
of the produce. Jobbers could fit in this category or between levels. The
15
jobber fills in the gaps that are missed by all the other facilitators. The
jobber usually buys produce with a specific outlet in mind, sorts and repacks
the produce to fit the needs of a particular institution. They may sell and
buy from anyone in the chain.
The broker also performs nearly the same duties as the selling' agent, but
brokers are not under contract and never take possession or own the produce.
They simply bargain for the highest price and take a percentage of the sales
as commission.
The commission merchant works a little closer with the producer than
either the selling agent or the broker. The commission merchant has facili
ties for handling, packing, pricing, and selling the produce. The commission
merchant takes possession but not title of the produce and receives instruc
tions from the producer on when or how to sell. Similar to the commission i
merchant, the merchant shipper has facilities for packing, handling, pricing,
and selling but the merchant shipper takes title and possession of the
produce.
There is no standard pattern in which produce moves from the grower to
consumer, .Some pertinent statistics indicate how the produce flows from the
producer to the consumer. Most of the fresh produce, 76 percent, is sold
through retail grocery stores, another 22 percent is sold through the institu
tional outlets such as the restaurants, hospital cafeterias, and fast^food
outlets. The remaining 2 percent is sold in the direct-to-consumer market
(McLaughlin and Pierson, 1983). Chain stores represent 65 to 100 percent of
the retail grocery trade in the midwestern region (Spotton et al., 1986). If
their total retail share is similar to. their share of fresh produce sales, the
wholesaler-retailers sell the major share of the wholesale fresh produce in
the upper Midwest (Spotton et al., 1986).
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The wholesaler-retailer appears to be the major recipient of fresh
produce. But what path does it take to arrive at the wholesaler-retailer?
Evidence indicates that the produce moves primarily to the wholesaler-retailer
directly from the grower-shipper. The grower-shipper produces the fruits and
vegetables and ships directly to the wholesaler-retailer or directly to the
grocery store by-passing all the middlemen. The industry term for this is
direct-marketing (not to be confused with direct-to-consumer marketing).
This portion of the trade has increased dramatically in the past years,
as evidenced both by the sales statistics and by the decline in the number of
terminal markets (Rhodes, 1983), Further evidence was provided by an Iowa
State University survey (Spotton et al., 1986) in four major metropolitan
areas. The major wholesaler-retailers in the areas were buying most commodi
ties directly from the shipper, and they implied that those shippers were also
usually the growers. In addition, the buyers indicated that they only
purchased from the terminal markets when a shipment did not arrive or they
found themselves short of produce from other resources.
The direct-marketing scheme is not dominant for all wholesaler-retailers
in some crops. For example, tomatoes and potatoes tend to be purchased from
jobbers or repackers. The repacker may sort tomatoes according to maturity,
continue the ripening process for those still too immature to sell, and
package those ready for sale. But, some retailers may have their own repack
ing and ripening facilities and buy the produce directly from the grower.
Requirements for the commercial wholesale fresh produce market
The marketing requirements for selling produce in the commercial whole
sale fresh channel are rigid. These marketing requirements include long
17
shelf-life, ease of handling, and good physical outward appearance for the
fresh produce.
The longer the shelf-life of the produce, the more likely it is that the
store will be able to sell that produce before it deteriorates. To provide
for the long shelf-life required by the industry, the commercial fresh
producer must invest in ice or cooling .equipment such as a hydrocooler to
remove the field heat from the perishable produce and slow its deterioration.
In addition, the grower must be able to distinguish between vegetables that
are chilling-injury sensitive and those that are not. Produce such as
cucumbers, green peppers, and tomatoes are very sensitive to chilling-injury
and precise temperature ranges must be adhered to in the cooling process.
Crops such as-sweet corn and broccoli may be iced. The costs of icing are
similar per unit to hydrocooling when the hydrocooler is. used at capacity
(Junge et al., 1985)". Thus, to remove field heat and provide a long shelf-
life, $.01 to $.02 per pound must be added to the overall produce cost.
Buyers want the produce to be'packed in boxes that are sturdy enough to
be transported in stacks four boxes high on pallets to promote ease of
handling. The cost of the ideally sized box is usually $.80 to $1.00 and adds
considerably to the cost of the produce (Junge et al.., 1985).
Because the appearance of the produce is as important to the wholesaler
as it is to the consumer, the commercial wholesale producer must invest a
considerable amount of time in sorting and sizing the produce. Uniformity as
well as the lack of bruises and nicks is important to the overall appearance
of the produce.
There are other requirements to compete in the commercial wholesale"
channel. The-supplier not only-must be a reliable source in the quality of
the produce sold but must also remain in the market week after week. The
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producer who is in the market one week and out the next will not continue to
sell in the wholesale channel for long. Wholesalers need to provide their
customers with a stable produce supply and, therefore, require the same
stability from their suppliers (Spotton et al, 1986). Thus, irrigated acreage
would help a producer to meet the reliability requirement. With irrigation
the producer is more likely to weather periodic droughts during the summer and
provide a dependable steady produce supply.
One last restriction for selling in the wholesale sector is that the
grower must sell at only one level of the market chain per region. Whole
salers indicate that they do not like to buy produce from a grower and then
find the grower also has sold to the wholesaler's customer. They do not want
the grower to set up a roadside stand across from the retail outlet that the
wholesaler supplies because they feel they should not compete with their
supplier. Thus, growers who participate in the direct-to-consumer markets
probably do not enter the commercial wholesale market in the same area. This
phenomenon may occur occasionally as long as the grower does not compete too
obviously (Spotton et al., 1986).
Determining the suppliers of Iowa's commercial wholesale fresh market
Although Iowa may produce a number of acres of fresh vegetables, most of
that production finds its way into the processing and direct-to-consumer
markets rather than into the commercial wholesale fresh market. In 1985 the
Iowa Department of Agriculture (IDA) surveyed the wholesalers and wholesaler-
retailers in Iowa to determine the quantities of produce being bought and from
which states they were being bought. The IDA surveyed all the firms in Iowa
that could be identified as buyers and sellers of fresh produce in the
19
commercial wholesale fresh market, but the retail outlets were not surveyed
unless they were wholesaler-retailers (Valley, 1985).
Similarly, Iowa State University studied the feasibility of selling fresh
fruits and vegetables in the four surrounding metropolitan areas: Chicago,
Kansas City, St. Louis, and Minneapolis. As a part of that study the
wholesaler-retailers and a sample of independent wholesalers and terminal
market wholesalers were interviewed to determine the commercial wholesale
fresh market requirements. During those interviews the wholesalers were asked
who supplied their produce during Iowa's production season, whether Iowa sold
them any produce and, if so, how much, which crop, and whether their buying
volumes declined during the peak local growing season.
Iowa's major suppliers and the surrounding state's suppliers according to
these two surveys are listed in Table 3, although more states actually were
reported to surveyors than are listed. Because of the informal survey method,
the two surveys show a different list of suppliers for the surrounding major
metropolitan areas and the Iowa market, but there are a number of similarities
between the two surveys. Snap beans, cabbage, sweet corn, green peppers, and
winter and summer squash were generally supplied by midwestern states but
could be bought from California or Florida. Broccoli was almost exclusively
supplied by California although some was bought from Texas, Chicago buyers
indicated a willingness to purchase local broccoli although buyers in all of
the other metropolitan areas surveyed were reluctant to buy from local
growers. Few reasons were given for lack of interest in local produce.
Tomatoes were purchased mainly from California, but some were purchased from
midwestern sources. Some differences in cucumber and watermelon purchases
were noted. The IDA survey indicated that most melons were bought from
20
Table 3. Iowa's Fresh Produce Competitors
Competing Regions:
Crop
Broccoli
Snap beans
Cabbage
Sweet corn
Cucumbers
Leaf lettuce
Iowa Department of
Agriculture^
California, Texas
Michigan, Wisconsin
California, Illinois,
Michigan, Wisconsin
California, Florida,
Illinois
California, Florida,
Texas
California, Florida,
Michigan, Wisconsin
Muskmelons Arizona, California, Texas
Green California, Florida,
peppers Michigan
Potatoes Idaho, Wisconsin
Summer California, Florida,
squash Michigan
Winter California, Michigan
squash
Tomatoes California, Florida,
Michigan
Iowa State University
California, Illinois,
Michigan, Wisconsin
Florida, Illinois, Indiana,
Michigan
Florida, Illinois, Texas
Illinois, Indiana, Michigan
California, Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan
California
California, Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan
California, Illinois,
Michigan
California, Idaho, Illinois,
Michigan, Wisconsin
Illinois, Michigan
Florida , Michigan,
Illinois
California, Illinois,
Michigan
Watermelon California, Florida, Texas Illinois, Missouri, Texas
^Valley (1985).
^Spotton et al, (1986)
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California, Florida, or Texas, whereas the ISU survey indicated that most were
bought from nearby states.
The majority of Iowa wholesalers reported that less than 1 percent of the
total produce bought during the summer months was from Iowa producers (Valley,
1985). Their major reason for not buying from Iowa growers was that Iowa
produce failed to meet the quality standards of produce that they could buy
elsewhere (i.e., the produce failed to meet boxing, cooling, and appearance
standards). The Iowa State University survey of nearby metropolitan areas
also indicated that very little produce was bought from Iowa. Most buyers
reported buying no produce from Iowa and rarely would a buyer indicate that he
had received Iowa crops. One buyer mentioned that he had bought muskmelons
(cantaloupe) from Iowa, but only for same day delively to his stores (Spotton
et al., 1986).
To properly determine Iowa's competitive position in the Midwest, some
estimate of the volume supplied by each competitor is necessary. No data of
this type are available for Iowa. However, the USDA reports produce arrivals
to the Chicago market, and includes information by commodity in hundredweights
(cwts.) for each state supplying wholesalers in the Chicago area. It seems
likely that these same competitors supply Iowa in roughly the same proportion
as they do Chicago.
By using the Chicago arrivals data as a rough approximation of competing
suppliers' market shares,and information' on Iowa harvest periods, quantities
supplied to the Iowa market for each month are estimated. Each supplying
state was assumed to supply Iowa in the same proportion that it supplied
Chicago. The proportion of yearly per capita consumption purchased each month
was assumed to be similar to the ratio of each month's arrivals to total
annual arrivals multiplied by the annual per capita consumption. The
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percentage of the monthly markets supplied by each state for each crop are
listed in Table A, along with Iowa's estimated monthly consumption.
The 198A Chicago arrivals data show that^ California is the major supplier
of broccoli, leaf lettuce, cantaloupe (muskmelons), green peppers, tomatoes,
and early potatoes. If local suppliers are defined as including Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, and Wisconsin growers, but excluding Iowa (as
most buyers in the ISU survey did), the following crops are mainly supplied
locally: snap beans, cabbage, sweet corn, cucumbers, summer and winter
squash, watermelons., and some green peppers., The southeast Florida, and
others—provided larger amounts of snap beans, sweet corn, summer and winter
squash, and watermelon during the transitional months when local production
was just coming on the market. Texas, also a transitional period supplier,
was an early-summer supplier of cabbage and watermelons, and a late-summer
supplier of cucumbers, green peppers, and watermelons. Transitional periods
are in the spring and early-summer season, when local production is just
coming on the market, and in the fall when the first killing frost is hitting
the upper Midwest and southern states are just beginning fall harvest.
Comparative Production and Marketing Costs
To determine whether Iowa could expand in vegetable production and
compete effectively with current suppliers to Iowa and the midwest metropoli
tan areas, an examination of whether Iowa can produce and market at a lower or
equivalent cost to these major competitors must be made. The key factors to
be examined are production and transportation costs to midwest markets for
Iowa and competing states, consumer demand, and the risk faced by producers xn
each region. By comparing each competing region's costs, profitability and
risks, the states which can most effectively and efficiently supply the
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Table 4. Estimates of Competing Regions Share of Iowa Supply and Iowa
Consumption, by Crop
Crop/State
Broccoli
CALIF.
ILL.
MICH.
WIS.
Iowa Consumption (cwt.)
Snap beans
FLA.
GA.
ILL.
N.J.
N.C.
TENN.
Iowa Consumption (cwt.)
Cabbage
CALIF.
DEL.
FLA.
ILL.
IND.
KY.
MD.
MICH.
MISS.
N.J.
N.Y.
N.C.
OHIO
TENN.
TEX.
WIS.
Iowa Consumption (cwt.)
May June
100
1790
33
67
856
9
3
25
3
3
34
10418
July
90
10
1053
67
33
2568
39
18
11
7
14
18231
Month
August . September October
(percent)
75
25
842
50
25
25
3424
42
13
38
15627
63
26
11
2001
67
33
2568
27
27
36
14325
61
22
6
11
1896
50
33
17
3424
32
10
13
3
3
35
20185
Table 4. (Continued)
Crop/State
Sweet corn
ALA.
DEL.
FLA.
GA.
ILL.
IND.
KAN.
MO.
MICH.
N.Y.
OHIO
WIS.
Iowa Consumption (cwt.)
Cucumbers
FLA.
GA.
ILL.
IND.
MICH.
N.J.
N.C.
OHIO
S.C.
TENN.
TEX.
VA.
Iowa Consumption (cwt.)
Leaf lettuce
CALIF.
OHIO
Iowa Consumption (cwt.) 490
Muskmelons
ARIZ.
CALIF.
GA.
ILL.
IND.
N.J.
TEX.
Iowa Consumption (cwt.)
24
May June July
100 83
17
981
9
3
35
6
29
3
3
12
11095
21
7
14
43
4
4
7123
71
29
1144
87
9
1
2
1
1
34764
Month
August September October
(percent)
83
10
8
50907
33
13
33
20
7632
57
43
1144
96
1
2
1
1
53945
32
5
11
5
5
37
18600
15
15
38
8
15
8
6614
57
43
1144
96
1
29170
43
5
10
19
10
10
6852
16
25
6
6
16
13
16
3
5427
71
29
1144
83
17
3862
25
Table 4. (Continued)
Month
Crop/State May June July August September October
(percent)
• Green peppers
CALIF. 6 23 33 37
FLA. 6 5
GA. 28
ILL. 6 46 33 26
IND. 8 11
LA. 11
•
MICH. - 8 22 5
N.C. 39 15
TEX. 6 26
m Iowa Consumption (cwt.) 5223 7545 5223 3676
r Potatoes
ALA. 3
•
ARIZ. 2
CALIF. 57 6 0
COLO. 1 1
•i IDAHO 12 3 13 21
ILL. 3 02 2
IND. 1
m MICH. 0 3
MINN. 19 14 13
NEB. 0
N.D. 1 4
mt
N.M. 1
OKLA. 0
ORE. 2 8 2
M TEX. 21 17 2
VA. 0 0
WASH. 15 ' 4 2
m
WIS. 3 33 56 50
Iowa Consumption (cwt.) 56763 139395 94367 116881
Summer squash
• FLA. 14
GA. 33 17 14
r ILL, 67 60 50 50 43
j IND. 17 14
MICH. 40 50 17 14
Iowa Consumption Ccwt.) 30A 1015 812 1218 474
Winter squash
—
FLA.
14
GA.
17 14In ILL.
50 43
_
IND.
17 14
MICH.
17 14
Iowa Consumption (cwt.) 573 669
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Table A. (Continued)
Month
Crop/state May June July August September October
(percent)
Tomatoes
ALA. 1
ARK. 1
CALIF. 59
FLA. 4 44 55 90
GA. 4 6
ILL. 5 15 5
IND. 3 2
KY. 2 2
MICH. 18 17 1
OHIO 2 16 21 02
PA. 2
S.C. 8
TEX. 1
VA. 1 2
MEXICO 2 1
Iowa Consumption (cwt.) 24052 30125 20408 14253
Watermelons
ARK. 1
FLA. 23 25
GA. 44 3
ILL. 9 41 13
IND. 1 32 13
IOWA 3
MISS. 1
MO. 18 54 28 13
N.C 1
TEX. 12 2 16 50
Iowa Consumption (cwt.) 27200 92160 15360 1280
Source: USDA, Chicago Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Wholesale Market
1984.
Prices,
/
wJ
u
u
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midwest markets can be determined. To accomplish this task, a mathematical
programming model was developed to consider the relative competitive costs of
producing vegetables and more.traditional crops in Iowa versus producing
vegetables in competing regions. The model determined the prices and quanti
ties of vegetables delivered to Iowa markets by Iowa producers and other
competing states' producers so that the market had no excess supplies or '
demands.
Standard methods were used to incorporate upward sloping cost curves and
downward sloping demand curves to determine the prices that would clear the
market (Figure 3). These techniques are critical to a successful analysis
where the introduction of new production may cause lower market prices due to
increased output. As detailed in Figure 3,, the addition of new production
(the dashed line) tends to lower the price that will clear the market from
to Whether the new lower price will sustain a profit is important to new
vegetable producers, A similar approach has been used by agricultural policy
researchers (Norton and Solis, 1983) to analyze vegetable production in
Mexico.
Iowa s production and transportation costs are compared to competing
states* costs to produce and to reach the Iowa market. These constant cost
supply curves are adjusted for both market and production risk and, thus,
become upward sloping like the ones shown in Figure 3, By accounting for the
extent that gross revenues change from year to year, both price and yield .risk
can be included in the analysis. Assiming operators prefer less risk to more
(are risk averse), the more variable gross revenues are per unit of profit,
the less willing operators are to produce that crop. .Thus, by associating
increased variability in revenues with increased production cost, growers are
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Supply with current
producers
Supply with new producers
Demand
Output
Figure 3, Competitive Equilibrium Before and After a New Area Starts
Producing Vegetables
less willing to produce a crop with greater variability in revenues given a
certain level of profit (Anderson et al., 1977).
Hazell and Scandizzo's (197A) approach to incorporating variability in
revenue into the analysis was used. Deviations from average revenue increase
with increased production as shown in Figure A, panel a. These authors demon
strate that deviations from average revenue have a direct relationship to
variability in revenue as shown in 4b. They also show that because variance
increases at an increasing rate as production increases, the constant cost supply
curves adjusted for risk slope upward to the right as in panel c of Figure 4.
The demand curves or wholesale price-quantity relationships for the
vegetables were modeled using techniques similar to Duloy and Norton (1975).
Demand relationships were based upon Chicago prices and estimations of price
responsiveness in that market. The intersection of the supply curves and
a. Production
b. Revenue
Variance
c. Per Unit
Cost
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Deviations from
Average Revenue
Deviations from
Average Revenue
Risk Adjusted Supply
Constant Cost Supply
Production
Figure 4. Adjusting Supply Curves for Risk
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demand curves determines the equilibrium prices and quantities of vegetables
supplied to the Iowa market for each state involved as shown in Figure 3,
(For more details on the actual modeling procedure, see Weimar, 1986).
Once the model had been developed, it was used to analyze production and
marketing for the Iowa market. Because of the data estimation methods used,
steps were taken to determine how sensitive the results were to changes from
the most likely scenario. Yields were increased and decreased to simulate
possible differences in Iowa cost estimates. Furthermore, because rising
transportation costs were thought to be a leading cause of shifts in the cost
advantage, the effect of possible changes in fuel costs were studied. Lastly,
because Iowa's horticultural hourly wage is lower than the major producing
areas, Iowa's hourly wage level was doubled and the results were examined.
The next sections explain and describe the data and sources that were
used to obtain the results from the model. The results and analysis of them
follow the data description.
Iowa vegetable production costs
Because production cost estimates for any fruit or vegetable being
produced within the state of Iowa were not generally available, representative
Iowa production costs were estimated for this study. Five steps were involved
in estimating the representative crop-production budgets. First, northern
states' budgets served as a basis for developing initial budget estimates for
Iowa. Second, with the cooperation of the Iowa State Extension Horticul
turist, these budgets were modified through a cost engineering method to
reflect the basic cultural practices used in Iowa. Third, irrigation was
added, although it is not a common practice among lowans, because in some
instances it would reduce yield risk and increase quality (both are probably
D
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necessary to successfully supply commercial markets). Yields" were adjusted to
reflect the irrigation. Fourth, these intermediate budgets were reviewed by
five growers in the state to determine their validity and provide filial
technical input-output, price, and cost adjustments. Fifth, all the informa
tion was collected into a final budget form and the results were used in
analyzing the problem. Abbreviated versions of some of those budgets are-
shown in Table 5. The Iowa budgets and the budgeting process are discussed
more fully in Appendix A of Weimar (1986).
Competing states' budgets
Some differences between published budgets for the northern states' and
the California and Florida budgets can be accounted for by cultural practice
differences, but not all states report harvest costs, fixed costs, overhead,
marketing, and management. To ensure that the budgets from each state were
comparable, some assumptions were made-and the missing data were estimated.
For example, harvest costs on a per unit basis were assumed to be the same.
For states that had harvest costs, including cartons and cooling, the costs
were similar. Most states did not publish yearly budgets, so some budgets-
needed to be updated using the Agricultural Prices Summary (USDA, 1973-1984)
Prices Paid Index." Individual items were updated by using the price index
that most closely fit the item. For example, seed costs were updated using
the seed price index, fertilizer costs were updated by the fertilizer price
index, and so on. Thus, all budgets were estimated for the 1984 crop year.
Iowa and competing states' transportation costs
Transportation costs for other states were obtained from the USDA truck
rate and cost summary (USDA, 1985) and Iowa's within-state transportation
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Table 5. Representative 198A Iowa vegetable budgets for one acre
Crop Quantity
Broccoli
Total Revenue 5000
Preharvest Variable Costs
Land Preparation
Fertilization
Plants 8300
Planting
Pesticides
Cultivation
Irrigation
Interest
Total preharvest variable costs
Harvest Costs
Labor 70.00
Grading 7.00
Hauling
Ice 2.27
Cartons 227.27
Total Harvest Costs
Total Ownership Costs
Total Costs
Returns over Variable Costs
Returns to Unpaid Factors
Units
Lbs.
Plants
hours
hours
tons
cartons
Price
Per Unit
$ Ai
.32
5.00
5.00
43.05
.86
Total
$2050.00
14.96
88.06
265.60
54.00
39.41
81.68
12.24
35.94
588.82
350.00
35.00
4.54
97.73
195.45
682,72
300.23
1571.77
778.46
478.23
Table 5. (Continued)
Crop
Sveet Corn
Total Revenue
Quantity
1000
Preharvest Variable Costs
Land Preparation
Fertilization
Seed 8.00
Planting
Pesticides
Cultivation
Irrigation
Interest
Total preharvest variable costs
Harvest Costs
Labor 48.00
Grading A,80
Hauling
Ice 200.00
Cartons 227.27
Other
Total Harvest Costs
Total Ownership Costs
Total Costs
Returns over Variable Costs
Returns to Unpaid Factors
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Units
doz. ears
lbs.
hours
hours
cartons
cartons
Price
Per Unit
$1.25
3.09
5.00
5.00
.79
.86
Total
$1250.00
8.12
93.83
2A.72
A.76
A9.37
7.61
18.36
13. AA
220.20
2A0.00
2A.00
A.5A
158.00
194.00
2.20
620-54
347.76
1188.50
A09.26
61.50
Table 5. (Continued)
Crop
Green Pepper
Total Revenue
Quantity
300
Preharvest Variable Costs
Land Preparation
Fertilization
Seed 7200
Planting
Pesticides
Cultivation
Irrigation
Interest
Total preharvest variable costs
Harvest Costs
Labor 50.00
Grading 9.50
Hauling
Cooling 300.00
Cartons 300.00
Total Harvest Costs
Total Ownership Costs
Total Costs
Returns over Variable Costs
Returns to Unpaid Factors
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Units
bu.
plants
hours
hours
cartons
cartons
Price
Per Unit
$9.55
.027
5.00
5.00
1.41
.86
Total
$2865.00
14.96
74.09
193.68
•101.77
93.46
66.68
20.60
37.39
612.62
250.00
47.50
4.54
258.00
423.90
983.94
296.56
1893.12
1268,44
971.88
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costs were obtained by personal phone contacts with Iowa trucking firms.
Iowa's within-state costs were not much different from those obtained from the
USDA sources for Michigan to Chicago, approximately $3.30 per mile.
Competing state transportation rates to Iowa were not available from USDA
so estimated costs for shipments to Chicago from various states were adjusted
to reflect the distance to Iowa rather than to Chicago. In addition, because
the net weight of fresh vegetables carried per truckload differs from crop to
crop, the cost of transporting each vegetable was adjusted to reflect weight-
to-volume differences.
Price-quantity relationships
Price-quantity relationships were needed to determine how much prices
would change when local production increased. Iowa demand functions were
calculated based on prior estimates of Chicago-area demand relationships for
1972-76. These demand relationships obtained from the University of Georgia
(Epperson et al., 1981) for Chicago were similar to their estimates for other
cities, so midwestern price responsiveness estimates should be similar to
estimates for Chicago. The best procedure to obtain the demand relationships
would have been to reestimate these demand functions. Unfortunately, the
functions could not be updated because the original data was discontinued in
August 1976. Hence, these were the newest estimates of demand for fresh
vegetables available that cover the six marketing months investigated in this
study.
Per caT3ita consumption " '
No USDA estimates were available for 198A per capita consumption at the
time the study was initiated. Yearly per-capita consumption for 1984 was
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estimated from trend analysis of USDA data from USDA Food Consumption. Prices«
and Expenditures. 1983 covering 1962-1983. For a more complete discussion of
estimation methods see Appendix C of Weimar (1986).
Price and yield variability
Price and yield (revenue) variability is important information to both
producers and buyers. Revenue variability could be a good indicator of the
variability of net profits associated with each crop and would be important to
the growers' decision-making process. Buyers could be equally interested in
how variable their supply would be if they had to depend on a single region
for produce.
Yearly vegetable revenue data for all the competing regions were
collected from two USDA publications, Agricultural Statistics (USDA, 1961"
1982) and Vegetables Annual Summary (USDA, 1961-1982). The information was
compiled into gross revenue figures by state and a seasonal gross revenue was
used where possible for each month's harvested production in some states.
In the North Central region yields were not reported consistently over
time for each state, so estimates of gross revenue for each state were
estimated by using the closest state that had a complete gross revenue time
series for a particular crop. As a consequence, Michigan, Iowa, Illinois, and
Missouri have similar revenue variable estimates. To account for inflation in
the time series, the data were multiplied by the "Prices Received By Farmers
index" found in Agricultural Prices Summary (USDA, 1961-1982) and then a time
series of deviations from average revenue was calculated for each vegetable to
provide a measure of risk to the producer.
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Land availability
Land is not a limiting factor for Iowa self-sufficiency in the production
of fresh horticultural crops. Iowa's approximately 149,358 acres of peat and
muck soils, 722,377 acres of sandy and sandy loam soils and 5,200,802 acres of
silt and silt loam soils are more than double the total acres used for produc
tion of 22 major fresh vegetables, melons and potatoes in the entire United
States for 1981 (Hall,, 1985, Vegetables Annual Summary, 1982).
Analysis
The background information and data were analyzed to determine Iowa's
cost competitiveness for the 13 vegetables in this study: broccoli, snap
beans, cabbage, sweet corn, cucumbers, leaf lettuce, muskmelon, green peppers,
summer and winter squash, tomatoes, and watermelon. Iowa's production and
transportation costs to midwestern markets were compared to the competing
states production and transportation costs to those same markets to determine
if Iowa could supplant competitors in the midwest market for these vegetables.
By using the estimated price-quantity relationships for these vegetables, the
extent that market prices will be affected by possible supply changes was
considered in determining optimum acreage changes. Production risks by region
were included in the study to determine if the variability of yield and price
would affect who supplied the market.
In addition to determining whether Iowa could substitute its vegetable
production for that of its competitors at a lower cost, the sensitivity of
these results to changes in Iowa's estimated production costs, fuel costs,
and wage rates was examined. Because some estimates of production costs could
be inaccurate, yields were decreased and increased in lO-percent increments to
determine if errors in estimates of cost per cwt. would affect the results.
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Transportation costs are a large portion of the produces' value at the whole
sale market level, so changes in cost due to energy price increases or
decreases were examined. Because energy costs are approximately 15-20 percent
of trucking costs, rising or falling diesel costs may change, the least cost
area of production. Fuel costs were changed in 10 percent increments to
explore the possible resulting changes. Iowa has a relatively low wage rate
because there are no unions within the state for produce pickers. To account
for possible changes in this situation, Iowa labor costs were changed in 10
percent units and the results were examined.
Results
The results indicate that there are some opportunities for Iowa to
replace its current competitors in the commercial wholesale market. Iowa
appears to have the competitive edge in producing broccoli, snap beans,
cucumbers, muskmelons, potatoes, summer and winter squash, and tomatoes.
Tests of cost estimation error indicated that relatively large increases in
Iowa's costs could occur without changing the conclusions for most of these
crops. Only broccoli and potatoes seemed to be sensitive to small increases
in Iowa's cost estimates; small reductions in Iowa's costs made her competi
tive in the remaining crops. Scenarios with either rising or falling energy
costs did not change the primary conclusions of competitive advantage for
Iowa. Very large increases and decreases in costs or yields were necessary to
change the conclusions.
In the following sections the results are summarized by crop, indicating
the regions that predominantly supply the particular crop to Iowa, whether
Iowa has the lowest total production and transportation costs, and how much
cost estimates could vary while maintaining the same suppliers. For certain
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crops risk data were not available; for these crops, the analysis suggests who
is the least-cost producer without adjusting for risk. The impact of labor
and transportation costs changes are indicated. The results are contrasted
with recent marketing studies completed by Iowa State University (Spotton
et al., 1986) and the Iowa Department of Agriculture (Valley, 1985) regarding
qualitative restrictions on local production.
The potential for expanding vegetable production in Iowa will be outlined
under three scenarios: one that assumes no commercial fresh production is
occurring in Iowa, one that assumes production is occurring as estimated by
the 1982 Census of Agriculture vegetable acres (U.S. Department of Commerce,
1984), and one that assumes production is occurring as estimated by the 1985
ISU horticulture department data (Hall, 1985). The first scenario indicates
the number of acres for which Iowa has the competitive advantage if there were
no current commercial producers in Iowa, The other two scenarios provide
benchmarks against which a minimum potential for expansion can be defined.
Broccoli
The market for broccoli is dominated by California. In the Chicago
market, Illinois producers were capturing approximately 25 percent of that
market throughout the summer season. Unfortunately, no budgets on broccoli
were available from Illinois, Wisconsin, or Michigan, so the analysis was
based on California's and Iowa's production costs. Because California had the
only complete revenue time series for the broccoli crop, the broccoli analysis
examined cost competition between California and Iowa and did not include
risk.
The results indicate that Iowa's has a cost advantage in broccoli produc
tion, but that a 10-percent increase in Iowa's estimated cost would allow
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California to become the lowest cost competitor. Small errors in the cost
estimation process would give California the cost advantage.
Market survey results showed that commercial wholesale buyers in the
Midwest preferred the California broccoli to midwestern-grown broccoli.
Chicago-area market buyers did indicate a willingness to buy midwestern-grown
broccoli, but only if it was properly precooled and packed in standardized
boxes. The main reason stated for the reluctance to buy midwestern-grown
broccoli was that California growers tended to be more honest about the
quality of the crop and the uniformity of their pack was better than what
buyers had experienced with midwestern growers. The buyers thought the
Midwest had a lower quality crop partly due to the lack of precooling, which
enhances the crop's shelf life. There is, however, at least one instance
where an Iowa farmer is supplying the commercial wholesale market with fresh
broccoli that is not preqooled but has been stored in a cooler. Thus,
knowledge of the market niche's requirements may allow local growers to meet
buyer demands with less than a standard cooled pack. One of the major
problems that farmers will have to overcome in Iowa is staying in the market
for the duration" of the local season. Broccoli quality drops as summer
temperatures increase. According to the Chicago arrivals data, consumption of
the crop generally drops in August, the hottest summer month, probably because
of the lower quality crop on the market from all sources.
Snap beans
The proportion of the total quantity of snap beans currently produced by
local states is high once production starts in the northern region. Early
production takes place in Florida and Georgia and late production in Georgia
and North Carolina, but the main season is supplied by local states such as
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Illinois. The local supplier market share varied from 75 to 100 percent for
the peak summer season production. Thus, snap beans seem to be one crop that
has a strong potential to be grown in-state. The analysis indicated that this
was true. Separately changing production, fuel, and labor costs all gave
results that implied that Iowa's advantage in snap beans would not be lost
even with significant relative cost increases.
During the ISU buyer survey interviews (Spotton et al., 1986), snap beans
were listed as an item that is almost always purchased locally once the season
starts. The only restriction buyers indicated was that the snap beans be
handpicked rather than machine-picked. They thought that snap beans did not
have a long shelf life when machine-picked. They also stated that the
machines caused bruising of the bean, browning the bean and making it less
salable. They preferred and were willing to pay a higher price for handpicked
snap beans. The evidence indicates a good potential for increased production
of snap beans for the local commercial wholesale market.
Cabbage
Cabbage is a crop with many early or transitional-period suppliers to
Iowa and midwestern markets. Large early suppliers are Ohio and Texas, with
smaller competitors being California, Florida, Illinois and Texas. As the
local crop comes into production, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin become the
major suppliers.
The analysis indicates that the midwestern states have a cost advantage
in fresh cabbage production only when risk is included in the analysis. Iowa
would replace supplies from Ohio and the other states in the early and late
transitional market periods but the quantities are very small. A 10-percent
increase in Iowa's yield would make Iowa cost-competitive with the other
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midwestern states. But the cabbage market has been saturated for the last few
years and price has been substantially below long-run production costs.
Nineteen eighty-six was the first year in which a profit was obtained.
Consequently, growers should know that cabbage is a market that is very price-
responsive to increases and decreases in production. On the other hand,
cabbage may be used as a loss-leader by some growers as a method to entice
buyers to purchase other items they produce and it would not be as necessary
to make a profit on cabbage if they make a profit on other produce.
The source of cabbage supplies was affected more by fuel cost increases
than were most other crops but was similar to other crops in the lack of
response to increased labor costs in Iowa. A 20-percent increase in fuel
costs was necessary to make Iowa competitive with the other midwestern states
in all market periods except October, when a 30-percent rise was necessary
before Iowa became the least-cost producer.
Sweet corn
Sweet corn is another crop for which a considerable portion of Chicago
demand was supplied by local producers. Over one-half of the production was
supplied by Illinois, with the rest being supplied by New York, Florida, and
Georgia. Illinois supplied 100 percent of the August demand and 89 percent of
the September demand. New York, Ohio, Florida, and Georgia supply a portion
of the late summer production, except that Florida production first comes onto
the market in October. The demand for sweet corn appears to be very seasonal
according to the USDA arrivals data. The quantity consumed rises during July,
peaks in August, and falls through the rest of the season. August sweet-corn
arrivals were greater than all the rest of the summer harvest period arrivals
added together.- This study indicates that Iowa is a residual supplier
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inasmuch as Illinois and Ohio supplied all but a small portion of the Iowa
market. The results are fairly stable; a 20 percent increase in Iowa's costs
was necessary to bring in different states as suppliers to the Iowa market.
On the other hand, only a 10 percent increase in Iowa's yield, to just 1100
dozen ears, would remove Illinois from competition in this market. Fuel and •
labor-cost increases did not affect the results.
.These results do not appear on the surface to be consistent with the
current significant sweet corn production in Iowa, Two different explanations
for this apparent contradiction are immediately obvious. First, local retail
buyers may be willing to buy fresh sweetcorn that has not been precooled on a
day-to-day basis from local growers. Without precooling costs Iowa production
would be considerably less costly than sweet corn produced in the other
midwestern states, and local growers could compete effectively. This could
account for large amounts of production shown in Table 2. Second, the per ,
capita consumption figures used in this study to determine the quantity
demanded in Iowa may largely ignore the grower-direct-to-consumer and grower-
direct-to-retailer consumption because most production data is collected only
in major shipping areas and, thus, ignores production in local markets. The
actual explanation may be a mix of both of these reasons.
Cucumbers
Cucumbers are supplied to the Iowa market by Florida and North Carolina
in the early market periods and again during the October transitional market
period. Georgia supplies the October market and Texas supplies cucumbers in
September. Illinois is the major supplier of cucumbers, producing at least 50
percent of the cucumbers marketed, except during October, when it drops to 13
percent share of the monthly market. This latter figure may. reflect the
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portion of the month before frost kills the vines—Illinois still may be the
major supplier to the Chicago market during the earlier part of October. Due
to the high sensitivity of cucumbers to frost, there will be years in which no
midwest production occurs in October because frost will have occurred before
October.
Our analysis suggests that cucumbers could be produced by Iowa with
e^ectations of enormous returns for growers, and Iowa growers would produce
large quantities of them. Large increases in Iowa's cucumber production costs
did not change the conclusions to this study. A 40 percent increase was
necessary before there was any change in the results. Likewise, a 100-percent
increase in the labor costs did not change the results. But, the estimates of
price declines associated with these quantity changes are probably too
conservative. It seems that such quantity increases would likely have a
pronounced impact on local market prices, and such extreme increases would not
be feasible without destroying profitabilityi
Leaf lettuce
Approximately 40 acres of leaf lettuce are required to meet Iowa's
demand at current prices. A competitive analysis was not feasible because
budgets for California, the major producer, could not be obtained.
Muskmelons
Muskmelons are primarily supplied by California in all market periods,
with local producers capturing 2 to 4 percent of the market during August and
September according to the Chicago arrivals data. Muskmelons are a crop with
a seasonal demand; production rises during July^ peaks in August, and falls
during the rest of the market season according to the Chicago arrivals data.
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Total local production to the Chicago market actually peaks during July and
remains fairly even throughout the rest of the market periods. Ohio is the
only supplier other than Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and California.
The results indicated that Iowa is the least-cost producer of muskmelons.
Those conclusions remain true with a 10-percent increase in production costs.
At 20 percent, Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan production enter the results.
With a 50-percent increase in Iowa's estimated costs, California and Ohio
become the primary suppliers. Thus, the analysis indicates that costs or
yields could be considerably underestimated and the conclusions would still
remain the same. Changing fuel costs and Iowa's labor costs had no effect on
the result.
These results must be qualified, however, by conclusions drawn from the
Iowa State University survey (Spotton et al., 1986). California currently
supplies a considerable portion of the muskmelon market. In the industry,
buyers refer to California muskmelons as cantaloupe and midwestern of eastern
muskmelons as muskmelons. This distinction between the areas indicates that a
quality difference is perceived by these buyers. In fact, there is a
difference. California muskmelon is smaller than the midwestern melon and has
a longer shelf-life, even when both are cooled. Midwestern wholesale buyers
have indicated a reluctance to buy midwestern melons in any larger portion of
the market without precooling, but did indicate they were willing to increase
purchases if the crop was properly precooled, even though it still has a
shorter shelf-life than the California muskmelon.
Green peppers
Green peppers are supplied in the early summer transitional market
periods by California, Texas, Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina. Local
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production by Illinois and Michigan accounts for more than 60 percent of
consumption during August and September, and they supply one-third of the
market in October. The fact that they supply only 6 percent of the July
market may reflect the portion the month during which they are able to
produce.
The results of this study indicated that Iowa would only be a residual
supplier of green peppers. Illinois, Michigan, Florida, and Georgia had lower
costs of production than Iowa and supplied the greatest portion of the green
pepper market. An increase of 30 percent in the yield to about 113 cwt. per
acre would be necessary for Iowa to compete in the early markets. But to
remove Illinois from competition during the main season, a yield of about 122
cwt. per acre was necessary. On the other hand, to remove Iowa as a residual
supplier would require a 40-percent increase in costs. The green pepper
results were unaffected by rises in fuel costs or Iowa labor costs. Because
the green pepper results were insensitive to all but large cost changes, the
quantities that could be supplied by Iowa should be fairly stable over time.
Local buyers showed no reluctance to buy-green peppers and USDA arrivals to
the Chicago market indicate that green peppers are being bought from local
producers, so local producers should not meet any resistance in their
marketing efforts.
Potatoes
Potatoes were supplied in the early transitional market periods by the
Southwest U.S.; Idaho, Michigan, Washington, and Wisconsin supply some of the
market during these periods but do not become large suppliers until August,
when they are joined by North Dakota and Minnesota. Wisconsin becomes the
largest single supplier to the Chicago market in August. The Iowa Department
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of Agriculture survey indicates a similar list of suppliers to the Iowa
wholesale market.
The analysis indicates that Iowa has a cost advantage in the production
of potatoes, but small changes in either yields or production costs could
change the results. Both Idaho and Michigan would be suppliers with a 10
percent increase in Iowa's costs. However, a 30-percent increase in costs
was necessary to bring Wisconsin, normally a large supplier, into the market
based on the yield and cost estimates available. With a 50-percent increase
in Iowa's costs, California would become competitive in our analysis. In
addition, the potato-supplying regions were relatively unresponsive to rises
in Iowa's labor costs. Potato suppliers did not change until a 100-percent
increase in Iowa's labor costs were incurred. Washington then entered the
market in all market periods.
Midwestern buyers indicated little resistance to buying locally produced
potatoes. But the ISU survey noted that some buyers were reluctant to buy
directly from growers (Spotton et al., 1986). These buyers indicated they
bought their potatoes from a repacker who sorted and repacked the potatoes to
meet the buyers specifications. This is another instance where it is
necessary for the grower to satisfy the buyer's specification to achieve
successful market entry.
Simmer and winter squash
Squash is a vegetable with extraordinarily little market or production'
cost data. Arrivals to Chicago are lumped together for both winter and summer
types and there"are many varieties of each. There are no data for per capita ^
consumpti.on. Yet, because squash is very easy to grow in Iowa, squash is
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produced by a number of growers though little is known about the level of
supply necessary to meet demand.
Estimates of per capita demand were derived from the Chicago arrivals
data and from the ISU survey data. By using the Chicago arrivals data, it was
found that Georgia supplied some squash in the early and late market, with
Florida entering in October. Local suppliers such as Illinois, Indiana, and
Michigan supplied the major portions of the Chicago market in all periods.
Of the three local states supplying Chicago, none were found to have
squash production cost budgets available; consequently, Missouri's squash
budgets were used as an approximation for these three states. Squash produc
tion data were not available for a revenue time series. Hence, risk could not
be analyzed as a part of the study.
Iowa has the cost advantage in the production of both tj^pes of squash,
but summer squash results were fairly responsive to cost estimation error
while winter squash was not. A 20-percent increase in costs was necessary to
change the results for summer squash and a 50-percent increase was necessary
for winter squash. A 100-percent increase in labor costs was necessary to
switch from Iowa to Missouri for summer squash. Labor cost increases also had
little impact on winter squash results.
Tomatoes
A number of states supply tomatoes to Chicago according to the arrivals
data. California, however, is the single largest supplier of tomatoes, with
approximately one-half or more of the total. Only in August do they slip to
one-third of the market and local suppliers pick up one-third of the market.
Texas, Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina are minor suppliers of tomatoes in
the transitional market periods of July and October. Ohio also is a minor
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supplier in the transitional months, but is as large as either of the local
states, Illinois and Michigan, during August and September.
Iowa again has a cost advantage in the production of tomatoes. Large
errors in the yield estimates would be necessary to change these conclusions.
There were no changes in the results after a 30-percent decrease in yields,
and Michigan became a supplier only after a 40-percent decrease in the Iowa
yield. California production entered the results after a 50-percent decrease
in Iowa's yield. Because tomatoes were fairly labor intensive, a doubling of
the labor costs decreased the amount of tomatoes being produced by Iowa but
did not change supply regions from the original conclusions.
Although these results indicate that tomatoes can be grown profitably in
Iowa, they should be viewed skeptically. The percentage of locally grown
tomatoes on the Chicago market is fairly low even at the peak of the harvest
season, so there must be some reason why California enjoys a large measure of
success in these markets, even if tomato production is less costly in local
areas. A portion of their success is due to consumer recognition of
California tomatoes by taste. In a taste test completed at the 1985 Iowa
State Fair, 50-percent of the people preferred the taste of the California-
grown tomato to the Iowa-grown tomato (personal communications with Camille
Valley, Iowa Department of Agriculture). This indicates a consumer preference
for a particular flavor of tomato or an inability to distinguish between
locally grown and California-grown tomatoes. Also, during the ISU survey of
midwestern buyers, all but those in Chicago indicated that they preferred to
buy "gas green" tomatoes—green tomatoes that are ripened artificially with
ethylene gas from California, Therefore," even though production cost
information indicates that tomatoes could be grown at a lower cost in Iowa,
there are indications that consumers prefer California's tomatoes.
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Watermelons
Watermelons, like muskmelons, tend to have a highly seasonal demand.
Demand rises during July, peaks in August, declines rapidly through September,
and is negligible in October. Florida and Georgia are transitional suppliers
of watermelons in both the early and late market periods. Texas is primarily
a transitional market period producer. Local producers, Illinois and
Missouri, supply the largest portion of watermelons shipped to the Chicago
market during August and September. Iowa also ships a small quantity during
August according to the USDA Chicago arrivals data,
Iowa is a residual supplier of watermelons in our analysis of the commer
cial wholesale market. Both Illinois and Missouri claim to have a lower per
unit cost of production, A small 10 percent increase in Iowa's yield however,
gave Iowa the cost advantage except in early-period production. Missouri held
the advantage in July production even after yields were increased by 50
percent, although Illinois dropped out after Iowa's yield increased 30
percent. There was evidence that growing practices such as transplants and
plastic mulch to enhance early harvest do not pay off.
On the other hand, an Iowa yield decrease did not change supply regions
until Iowa's yield had decreased by approximately 30 percent. Then Georgia
and Texas entered in all market periods. Florida did not enter the market
until a 50-percent decrease in costs was imposed. This indicates that Iowa
producers could, with only a small increase in yield, be competitive with
other midwestern states. At the same time, Iowa yields are high enough that
Florida and Georgia pose no threat should Iowa produce for the commercial
market. Thus, in August and subsequent months, better Iowa producers should
be able to compete with other local states for the commercial wholesale
market.
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Crop summary
Table 6 sununarizes the suppliers with the competitive edge and their
possible market shares in the Iowa market. These results only encompass those
crops for which both price-quantity relationships and risk could be evaluated;
Broccoli and the squashes were only evaluated in terms of least cost producing
areas. Leaf lettuce could not be evaluated because competing states did not
have budget information.
Opportunities for Iowa producers in the metropolitan markets
A similar analysis to the one accomplished for the Iowa market was
attempted for the four nearby metropolitan areas. Preliminary results
indicate there could be some opportunities for Iowa producers to enter markets
in broccoli, snap beans, cucumbers, muskmelons, potatoes, and tomatoes. These
are the same crops for which Iowa held a cost advantage in the Iowa market.
The same precautions should be applied to these markets as were applied to the
Iowa market. Buyers have been hesitant to deal with local growers because
growers lack sufficient cooling and industry-standardized boxes. In addition,
there may be some nonquantifiable marketing costs that may limit Iowa growers
success in these markets. These costs may include overcoming marketing
hurdles for new entrants such as establishing the grower's reputation and
having the local product accepted as -a quality product in the eyes of the
consumer. Even though the results indicate some potential for lowans to
penetrate the market, unforeseen costs could eliminate them from competition.
Implications for Iowa Agriculture
In the previous sections, the results of this study have been discussed '
and analyzed. In this section those results will be transformed into acres of
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Table 6. Suppliers and Percent Market Shares for Selected Crops by Market
Period
Crop/State
Snap beans
Iowa
Cabbage
Iowa
Illinois
Sweet Corn
Iowa
Illinois
Ohio
Cuctmibers
Iowa
Muskmelons
Iowa
Illinois
Green Peppers
Iowa
Illinois
Michigan
Florida
Georgia
Potatoes
Iowa
Washington
Tomatoes
Iowa
Watermelons
Iowa
Illinois
Missouri
Texas
Georgia
June
100
88
12
July
100
14
86
68
32
100
96
4
61
6
6
27
100
100
23
1
18
13
45
Month
August
100
A
96
100
100
100
38
54
8
100
100
40
26
34
September October
100
5
95
11
84
5
100
100
33
44
23
100
100
50
33
17
100
6
9A
71
20
9
100
100
83
13
2
2
95
5
100
89
5
6
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crops that are necessary to meet demand, in the Iowa commercial wholesale fresh
market. Table 7 summarizes those results. Dividing the assumed quantities
demanded by the assumed yield per acre indicates the potential acres that are
needed to meet current demand and maintain 198A price levels. "Best Estimate
Acres" indicates the acres under the most realistic scenario of the model when
risk is included in the analysis; "No Risk Estimate of Acres," indicates the
results if all producers were unaffected by risk. •
Note that in certain instances the acres reported are greater than the
potential available. In these instances more than 100 percent of the current
quantity demanded by the consuming public was being supplied by Iowa
producers. This occurred because Iowa's costs were substantially below
current costs by outside producers. With low costs and prices, consumption
would increase but the precise changes are difficult to measure. Where the
predicted quantity supplied exceeded 150 percent of current consumption it was
truncated at the 150% level. For these crops, specifically snap beans,
cucumbers, muskmelons, and tomatoes, prices would be e3q)ected'to fall from
current levels because of the drastic shift in the supply curve. Given that
Iowa produces at considerably less cost than their competitors, prices would
clearly fall to bring profits and risk back into equilibrium, other factors
being equal.
The potential acres needed to meet demand is approximately 5000. The
best estimate of Iowa's potential is for approximately 3900 acres of the crops
included in this study. Without risk and with crops limited to a maximum of
150 percent of current consumption, approximately 6600 acres of crops were
necessary to satisfy Iowa's needs. This difference in vegetable-crop acreage
is mainly due to increased potato production in all market periods and the
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Table 7. Demand for Fresh Vegetables in the Iowa Commercial Wholesale Fresh
Market and Estimated Acres to Meet Demand
Expected Estimated Best^ No Risk
(
L.
Yields Summer Potential Estimate Estimate
Crop /Acre Demand Acres of Acres of Acres
• -
(Cwt.) (Cwt.) (
w
Broccoli 50..00 7585 151. 7 151. 7 151. 7
Snap beans 101,.50 12840 126. 5 189. 8 189. 8
Cabbage 250..00 78788 315. 2 57. 3 315. 2
Sweet corn 95..00 87456 920. 6 151. I " 979. 3
Cucumbers 393..75 26796 68. 1 94. 2 102. 1
Muskmelons 250..00 121744 487. 0 549. 8 713. 7
Leaf lettuce 150..00 5050 40. 3 40. 3 40. 3
Green peppers 87..00 21670 249. 1 137. 8 253. 9
Potatoes 250.,00 407407 1629. 6 1722. 1 2444. 4
Summer Squash 300..00 3822 12. 7 12. 7 12. 7
Winter Squash 300..00 1242 4. 1 4. 1 4. 1
Tomatoes 300..00 88838 296. 1 444. 2 414. 5
Watermelons 200..00 136001 680. 0. 344. 2 976. 0
Total Acres 4981. 0 3899. 2 6597. 7
^The "Best Estimate" refers to the potential number of acres of crops
that Iowa has some competitive advantage to produce when all factors of the
analysis are included.
^The No Risk Estimate refers to the potential number of acres in our
conclusions if risk was not accounted for in our analysis.
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expanded crop production by Iowa of cabbage and sweet corn when risk is not
considered in the analysis.
Perhaps the most difficult part of this analysis was to predict the
number of acres that-could replace corn aiid soybean acreage; The upper limit
on the total acres necessary to meet Iowa's demand"for the 13 fruits and
vegetables in this study is approximately 6600 acres. This value, however, is
optimistic because it allows supply of almost all crops to move down their
demand curves to a point where the quantity supplied is 150 percent of the
predicted quantities demanded in 1984. The demand curves used in this
analysis are only good predictors near the current consumption levels, so
prices could fall off considerably if 150 percent of current demand were
produced, and actual acreage could be less than 6600 acres. The 3900 acres
predicted in the best estimate is probably less than that which could be grown
by Iowa producers. This is because certain crops such as sweet corn appear to
enter a portion of the commercial wholesale market without the precooling that
sweet corn shipped from outside the'state must have to maintain shelf life.
Current production levels in Iowa are not well known. The room for
expansion, given this study's best estimate, is shown in Table 8. The
estimate in the first column assumes that none of the producers in Iowa
produce for the commercial wholesale fresh market. But, USDA data shows that
lowans do grow approximately 1600 acres of potatoes for the commercial whole
sale fresh and processing markets. Thus, the potential would be for the 3899
acres predicted by the model minus those 1600 acres of potatoes grown for
commercial wholesale fresh or processing markets. Even that is not a good
estimate because Agricultural Statistics does not separate processing acres
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Table 8. Predicted Ejqpansion Potential for Horticulture Crops In Iowa
Potential Expansion as
the difference between
1982^ 1985^ the best prediction and
Crop Best Prediction Study Study each study
(Acres) (Acres) (Acres) 1982 1985
Acres Acres
Broccoli 150 7 0 143 150
Snap beans 190 34 0 156 190
Cabbage 57 105 200 0 0
Sweet Corn 151 5619 3700 0 0
Cucumbers 94 29 0 65 94
Leaf lettuce 40 0 0 40 40
Muskmelons 550 429 800 121 0
Green peppers 138 75 80 63 58
Potatoes 1722 1767 600 0 1122
Squash 17 97 250 0 0
Tomatoes 444 473 60 0 384
Watermelons 344 345 700 0 0
Total Acres 3899 8980 6390 588 2038
^Acres listed in the 1982 Census Agriculture. U.S. Department of
Commerce, 1984,
b Acres listed by ISU Department of Horticulture Study.
j
j
j
J
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from fresh tablestock potato acres; 2300 acres would likely be an under
estimate of the acreage that Iowa could competitively produce for self
sufficiency in fresh vegetables. Two additional sources of data were used to
find a benchmark'from which to estimate potential expansion acreage. Each
source had its problems. The 1982 Census of Agriculture (U.S Department of
Commerce, 198A) estimates acreage may have changed by 1984. And, even if
those acreages were comparable, those estimates included processing acres that
are not included in this study. Furthermore, this study assumes irrigated
land is necessary to obtain the yields assumed, and only about 800 acres were
irrigated in the 1982 study.
The 1985 data set has similar difficulties. It is based on the best
estimate of Henry Taber, the ISU State Extension Horticulturist. Both acres
and yields could be suspect because .there was no actual data collected, just a
recollection of acreages and yields seen or heard, and his estimates are based
on 1985 rather than 1984. 'But these sources help estimate lower limits on the
expansion potential for Iowa.'
Table 8 shows the acreage' difference between this study's best prediction
and both the 1982 and 1985 acreage data sets. Both acreage estimates (USDA
and Taber) indicate that there are almost no current acres in broccoli, snap
beans, cucumbers, and leaf lettuce. Sweet corn, cabbage, and squash seem to
be near potential demand' if they arie supplied direct to the retail outlet.
The potential expansion in squash acreage however, could be" considerably
underestimated in this study, ^ There may be some room for expansion in
According to ISU's estimates during their survey of Chicago buyers, USDA
arrivals in Chicago seemed to underestimate the quantity demanded by 2 to 5
times. One possible explanation for this contradiction in data is that buyers
may have the deliveries made directly to the stores and not through the main
distribution warehouse. Thus, they may miss being counted by USDA data
collectors.
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muskraelon, green peppers, potatoes, and tomatoes. These crops take
considerable expertise to grow for the commercial market and would require
skill in production and marketing.
Given this information and assuming the sweet corn, cabbage, and squash
markets are saturated and that approximately 600 acres of potatoes are being
grown in Iowa for the fresh market, the potential for expansion for these
crops would be approximately 3100 acres. This assumes that in the markets
other than sweet corn, cabbage, and squash the considerable post-harvest
handling procedures have kept most of the current producers from entering the
commercial wholesale markets and that currently most of the production is
being marketed directly to the consumer.
Small farm opportunities and economic impacts for Iowa
One reason this study was undertaken was to find whether profitable
vegetable production opportunities existed for small farmers. Consequently,
the budgets estimated for Iowa were based on a machinery complement for a
40-acre farm. Our research indicates that opportunities exist for approxi
mately 75 small farmers.
Most policjmiakers are interested in the impact that introduction of the
alternative crops would have upon agricultural economy. By using this study's
best estimate of the totals production needed for the 13 crops for which Iowa
has some cost advantage, the total sales at the wholesale level that these
crops would bring farmers are $17.08 million. If Iowa farmers were to capture
the entire market (which is somewhat unlikely), the total would be $17.22
million.
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Summary
This paper has discussed Iowa's economic production potential for fresh
commercial wholesale vegetables. The study was designed to determine Iowa's
summertime competitors and the comparative costs of producing and marketing 13
major vegetables: broccoli, snap beans, cabbage, sweet corn, cucumbers, leaf
lettuce, muskmelon, green peppers, potatoes, summer and winter squashes,
tomatoes, and watermelon* Also studied were the effects production risk would
have on the overall willingness of Iowa producers to switch from their more
traditional, less risky crops, corn and soybeans, to the more risky vegetable
crops.
Because of the nature of the data available, several tests were made to
analyze how much error in cost data estimation was allowable without changing
the results. In addition, this study tested the effects that rising energy
and transportation costs would have on the location of production. Lastly
this research examined the effects of increasing labor costs in Iowa upon the
ability to substitute Iowa production for the current suppliers' production.
Iowa has a cost advantage in the production of snap beans, cucumbers,
muskmelons, potatoes, and tomatoes. If risk is not a factor in the decision-
makers criteria, then Iowa also would have a cost advantage in cabbage and
sweet corn. Results for broccoli, green peppers, potatoes, and summer squash
were very sensitive to cost estimation errors; therefore, the cost advantage
could be in some question for these crops. Only minor increases in yield were
necessary to give Iowa the cost advantage in the production of cabbage, sweet
corn, early muskmelons, and watermelons.
Approximately 5000 acres would meet Iowa's demand in the commercial
wholesale market for the 13 fruits and vegetables included in this study but
Iowa only has the cost advantage for approximately 3900 acres. The 3900 acres
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would bring approximately $17.08 million to the Iowa farm economy. There are
approximately an additional 3100 acres that are not currently in production in
Iowa. This could translate to approximately 75 small farms of about AO acres
in size, which was the base for the budgets included in this study. Clearly
this is very small compared to the 22 million acres of corn and soybeans grown
annually in Iowa. While not insignificant for a small number of producers,
the overall potential contribution of commercial fresh vegetables production
for wholesale markets to diversification of Iowa agriculture appears to be
small.
I
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